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IS IT WORTH FIGHTING CORRUPTION FOR GROWTH?  
 
1. Introduction 
Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon being present in all countries but 
with different intensity, being more intense in underdeveloped and transition 
economies (with our data, we computed that Spearman coefficient of correlation 
between Corruption, CPI, and well-being, GDP pc ppp, is 0.755). 
Corruption occurs when an individual with discretionary decision power 
overcomes limitations imposed by laws and regulations on private activities in 
order to get an advantage, i.e., to receive a bribe. Then, corruption is a principal-
agent problem where the agent (public servant) deviates from the objectives of 
the principal (government) to gain an illicit advantage, problem that can be 
controlled in an individual level by implementing a transparent decisions 
process and by creating economic incentives to the agent, Becker and Stigler 
(1974), which includes legal persecution and penalties for deviant behavior. 
Corruption is primarily a problem between a private economic agent and a 
public authority, government or state owned companies, and not between private 
agents (for example, an employee receiving a bribe to favor a provider with a 
higher price) because private agents having a more clear objective (they are 
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profit maximizers), they implement better control systems. Being mainly a 
public-private problem, corruption only occurs when there is some “government 
property”, for example, a permit to do a forbidden activity or the prohibition of 
entrance of competitors in the market, for which a “buyer” is willing to pay a 
price, Shleifer & Vishny (1993). By considering corruption as an economic 
transaction allows us to see that there is a connection between corruption and 
laws and regulations that limit private activities, i.e., being bribe a percentage of 
the gain obtained by the private agent when laws and regulations are not 
respected (the shadow price), a less restrictive legal system will decrease the risk 
of corruption. This fact indicates that, in aggregated level, fighting corruption 
passes by the liberalization of the economy, the privatization of state owned 
companies and the reduction of the weight of the state in the economy, 
Acemoglu & Verdier (2000), coincident with the Washington Consensus. 
Aggregated level anti-corruption strategy (i.e., liberalization, privatization 
and decreasing of regulations) is more efficient that individual level strategy 
(i.e., individual incentives and legal persecution) because it has lower costs, are 
wider in scale and police and judicial system that should control individual 
behavior are also subject to corruption.  
Although in static conditions corruption can be positive in countries with 
bad laws and regulations by alloying bureaucratic delays to be avoid and by 
motivating public servants to be diligent in order to receive bribes (e.g., low paid 
medical personal), in dynamic terms corruption is negative because corrupt 
people do not separate “good” from “bad” corruption and it is an incentive for 
public decision-makers to maintain and even develop bad laws and regulations 
(i.e., the weakening of institutional framework). The literature shows that 
corruption is a constraint to long-term economic growth thought diverse 
channels, Shleifer & Vishny (1993): Corruption allows that activities be done in 
a defective manner (e.g., violation of construction regulations), activities that 
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should be prohibited are carried out (that induces poor allocation of scarce 
resources, e.g., over fishing) and, by decreasing the protection of contracts, it 
decreases investment, innovation and FDI, Mauro (1995). It also induces the 
emergence of useless transaction costs in the economy and fiscal distortions. 
In this paper we will quantify with data from Transparency International 
and World Bank 1) the impact of corruption on economic growth and 2) if in 
economies in transition the impact of corruption is identical to its impact on all 
other economies. 
 
2. The quantification of the level of corruption 
Quantifying corruption is a significant aspect of developing national anti-
corruption strategy as it helps to identify priority and the impact of anti-
corruption policies. Nonetheless, being corruption a shadow element of 
economy, its quantification is difficult and controversial due to several reasons. 
Firstly, an examination of the legislation of different countries shows minimum 
international consensus on definitions of corruption, its breadth and forms that 
leads to the ambiguous understanding of the phenomenon. Therefore, the level 
of corruption can be seen as bigger in countries where corruption is defined 
more widely. Secondly, the national statistical data depends on the intensity of 
the fight against corruption. Countries with effective and comprehensive anti-
corruption policy have more identified corruption cases. The reverse situation 
can be observed in countries with weak policy and preference to keep hided the 
level of corruption (e.g., Kaufmann & Mastruzzi, 2007).  
Systematization of approaches to the quantifying corruption allows 
identifying several groups: 1) based on sociological surveys (e.g., World Bank 
polls, Worldwide Governance Indicators); 2) based on expert assessment (e.g., 
Nations in Transit projects, International Country Risk Guide, Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment); 3) based on integrated assessment (e.g., 
4 
 
Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International). Proxy indicators, 
as a good measure of anti-corruption results, can be complementary to existing 
indicators. In our study we will use the CPI- Corruption Perceptions Index as 
proxy for the level of corruption because it covers a wider range of countries and 
the scientific community recognizes it as informative and relevant. 
 
3. Results 
To evaluate the impact of corruption in the GDP growth rate and if it is 
different on transition economies, we will use data from World Bank (the 
variables GDPpc PPP, Gross Capital Formation, Consumption of fixed capital 
and Population, average for the period 2010-2014) and Corruption Perceptions 
Index for 2015 (Transparency International) as the level of corruption proxy. As 
theoretical framework we will use the growth model of Solow (1956) where 
GDP growth results from increases in labor, capital and technology transfers. 
The econometric model have as dependent variable the GDPpc PPP 
annual growth rate and as independent variable the liquid capital formation as 
percentage of GDP, LCF and GDP pc PPP to control for the technological 
diffusion. Then, we have the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI2015), a dummy 
variable coding transition economies, Trans, and its multiplication with CPI, CT.  
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Variables Estimates t values Significance levels 
B0 (Intercept)  -1.209e+00 -2.207 0.05 
B1 LCF 2.065e-01 16.700 0.001 
B2 GDP.pc -4.567e-05 -4.000  0.001 
B3 CPI 4.911e-02 4.545 0.001 
B4 Trans 2.430e-02 0.019 n/s 
B5 CPIxTrans 4.510e-03 0.147 n/s 
 R-project 
commands 
#Used data: www.fep.up.pt/docentes/pcosme/Data_corruption.csv 
X <- read.csv2("Data_corruption.csv") 
M<- (lm(GDPpcg ~ LCF+GDPpc+CPI+Trans+CT, weight = GDP, X)) 
summary(M) 
Table 1 - Results using WLS (R2 = 78%) 
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We assume as transition economies 25 countries from central and eastern 
Europe, ALB, ARM, AZE, BGR, BIH, BLR, CZE, EST, GEO, HRV, HUN, 
KAZ, KGZ, LTU, LVA, MDA, MKD, POL, ROM, RUS, SVK, SVN, TJK, 
UKR and UZB, that sum up 5,5% of the world population.  
We estimated the model using Weighted Least Squares using data from 
152 countries that sum up 96% do the world population (See, Table 1). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Using data from WB and IT, we observe that corruption decreases 
significantly economic growth and that transition economies are, in this aspect, 
identical to all other economies. In quantitative terms we conclude that in the 
transitions economies where the corruption level is higher (Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan) growth rate could increase one percentage point if they would 
implement efficient anti-corruption policies that would be capable of 
approximating corruption level to the world average one. 
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